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Abstract
This paper looks at the behavior of trade flows in eight countries in Latin America
that experienced an extreme nominal exchange rate depreciation. The composition of trade
flows  shows  a  very  persistent  pattern  around  these  episodes  of  large  exchange  rate
movements.  Both the industry composition of trade and the country composition of trading
partners remain stable after the devaluation occurs.  The relative importance of export and
import  industries  in  the  countries’  trade  flows  does  not  vary  substantially,  nor  does  the
importance of the different source countries for imports and destination countries for exports.
Exports to industrialized countries are especially sensitive to changes in the real exchange
rate, while bilateral import flows do not show much reaction to changes in bilateral exchange
rates.  
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1. Introduction
The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  look  at  the  effects  that  large  nominal  and  real
exchange rate devaluations have on the structure of trade flows of the devaluating country.
Large exchange rate movements have dramatic effects on the relative prices of tradable and
nontradable products as well as on the relative price of domestically produced goods and
imports and exports in world markets. Therefore, we would expect a large exchange rate
devaluation  to  stimulate  exports,  lead  to  substitution  of  domestically  produced  goods  by
imported products, and restructure the country composition of trade flows, depending on the
bilateral effective exchange rate devaluation that takes place. 
The standard argument behind the industry adjustment of trade flows to a nominal
exchange rate movement goes as follows. A large nominal exchange rate depreciation usually
implies a real exchange rate depreciation, at least to the extent that relative prices do not
adjust  by  the  same  amount  as  the  nominal  exchange  rate.  This  real  depreciation  in  turn
implies an increase in the price of imported products and a decrease in the world price of
domestically produced products. This change in relative prices implies an excess demand for
export-oriented goods, which should result in an increase in exports and a decrease in import
competing goods.
This argument, as stated, implies that the price sensitivity of demand as well as the
supply  elasticity  to  relative  price  changes  is  quite  high.  To  the  extent  that  bilateral  real
exchange rate movements do not imply large changes in quantities consumed and produced
(measured by trade flows), then the stated effect of a nominal devaluation may not be present. 
This study will look at the behavior of trade flows (imports and exports) around
periods of large nominal exchange rate devaluation in a sample of Latin American countries.
We will focus on the behavior of three indicators of external activity of the devaluating
country:  changes  in  the  industry  composition  of  trade  flows;  changes  in  the  country
composition of trade flows; and changes in the aggregate and bilateral trade flows of the
country during this period. We will also provide some estimates of the sensitivity of bilateral
imports and exports to exchange rate movements.
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relative ranking of import and export industries and trading partners. In most cases large
nominal exchange rate devaluations imply neither major changes in the industry patterns of
imports and exports into the country, nor major changes in the relative importance of the
major trading partners. Second, after an exchange rate devaluation occurs, the devaluating
country  increases  on  average  its  trade  flows  with  neighboring  countries.  Third,  bilateral
export  flows  with  industrialized  countries  are  most  sensitive  to  real  exchange  rate
movements. A real exchange rate depreciation significantly increases the amount of exports
from the devaluating country to these countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the methodology
used for determining the sample and the data are explained. Sections 3 and 4 describe the
changes in the industry and country composition of trade flows. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the
behavior of bilateral trade flows around these episodes. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Methodology
We have identified a sample of Latin American countries that have experienced an
exchange rate crisis since 1989. The definition of what constitutes an exchange rate crisis
differs depending on the purpose of the study. Given our emphasis on the effects on trade
flows, we focus on persistent nominal exchange rate devaluations (1). By “persistent” we
mean exchange rate devaluations that last longer than a year (measured using annual data)
and that imply a large nominal devaluation in the country’s currency. We first identified as a
“large” devaluation any annual change in the exchange rate that is significantly larger than
the previous history of devaluations in the country. The reason for making the definition of a
large  devaluation  country-specific  is  the  existence  of  periods  of  high  inflation  in  certain
countries  during  this  period.  The  behavior  of  the  nominal  exchange  rate  in  the  different
countries of Latin America has been extremely diverse, with long periods of large nominal
exchange rate depreciations due to very high domestic inflation rates and other periods of
fixed nominal exchange rates (see Table 1). Consequently, for the purpose of this study, we
define  an  exchange  rate  crisis  as  any  significant  change  in  the  annual  rate  of  nominal
depreciation of a country’s currency. Based on this method, we have identified twelve events
of exchange rate crisis that will be the basis for this study (see Table 2).
A first look at the time series behavior of the nominal exchange rates of the different
countries during the episodes indicated in Table 2 suggests two salient facts. First, for certain
countries  (Argentina  1989,  Brazil  1994)  the  nominal  exchange  rate  devaluation  that
constitutes the event comes after a period of several years of already large nominal exchange
rate depreciations. For other countries (El Salvador 1990, Honduras 1990, Mexico 1995) the
nominal devaluation comes after a period of very stable nominal exchange rates (2). Second,
the dating of our devaluation episodes does not necessarily coincide with the exact episode of
the devaluation (most notably Mexico, which we identify as having undergone a crisis in
1995, whereas the peso devalued in the last quarter of 1994). This is due to our using as a
measure of exchange rates the annual period averages rather than their end-of-period values.
This choice of measure is supported by two facts. The available data for trade flows are
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(1) Other indexes of exchange rate crises such as Kaminsky and Reinhardt (1998) also look at other indicators
of pressure on the foreign exchange market, such as changes in reserves or black-market premiums in
foreign exchange markets.
(2) The Appendix summarizes the most salient factors driving these countries’ political and economic situation
as well as their exchange rate policies around the date of the events.annual values which correspond to all trade flows during that period; and, secondly, trade
flows are more likely to be responsive to large persistent exchange rate movements than to
exchange rate changes that are quickly reversed.
Large nominal exchange rate changes affect the behavior of trade flows through
their impact on the relative prices of tradable goods in the economy. A change in the nominal
exchange rate affects the prices of export and import goods relative to domestically produced
goods, which implies changes in the real exchange rate. We would expect trade flows to be
responsive to changes in a country’s real exchange rate. During the episodes under study, the
nominal exchange rate changes translated into large real exchange rate changes. However,
those changes in the real exchange rate were not homogeneous, depending on the historical
behavior of nominal exchange rates in the country. The third column of Table 2 reports the
rate of real exchange rate depreciation of the home currency during the two-year period going
from the beginning of the year in which the nominal exchange rate crisis took place to the
end of the following year. There is a striking difference, as regards the behavior of the real
exchange  rate,  between  the  two  sets  of  countries  indicated  above.  In  Brazil,  Peru,  and
Argentina home currency goods became more expensive during this episode, due to an even
higher  domestic  inflation  rate.  For  the  remaining  countries  large  nominal  exchange  rate
devaluations were transmitted into real exchange rate devaluations. The last column of Table
2 reports the real exchange rate depreciation five years after the devaluation. With the notable
exception of Brazil and Argentina, all countries had experienced a relative convergence to
their initial long-term real exchange rates, with rates of real depreciation much lower than
those  they  had  experienced  only  two  years  after  the  devaluation.  In  Brazil  the  five-year
period ended just after the large real depreciation resulting from the collapse of the Real Plan
in February of 1999 and some of this depreciation was corrected shortly after that.
The purpose of this study is to look at the behavior of trade patterns resulting from
the currency devaluation. We will describe the behavior of trade patterns in the medium run
resulting from the devaluation. The adjustment of trade flows to their new equilibrium level
does not happen immediately. Exporters and importers need to identify new markets for their
products, establish relationships, and develop sales and distribution networks that allow them
to find substitutes for their current international partners. Therefore, our emphasis here will
be on the medium-run changes in trade patterns. We will describe the changes in the pattern
of trade by comparing the industry and country trade patterns of the devaluing country in two
different  time  periods.  The  average  of  trade  flows  in  years  t-3  and  t-4  will  describe  the
situation prior to the devaluation. The average of trade patterns observed in years t+3 and t+4
will be our indicator of trade patterns after the devaluation, where t refers to the year in which
the devaluation took place.
There  is  an  extensive  literature  looking  at  the  effects  that  large  exchange  rate
devaluations  have  on  the  economic  activity  of  the  devaluing  country.  This  literature  has
generally focused on two different lines of research: 1) trying to identify the macroeconomic
situation of the country that leads to a devaluation and how such a situation can be prevented;
and 2) trying to describe the optimal policy prescription to overcome the negative effects of
the devaluation. The literature on currency crises has focused primarily on the first part, with
the initial work by Krugman (1978) on balance of payments crises, followed by many more
models  that  try  to  endogenize  the  policy  decisions  facing  a  government  confronting  a
speculative attack (see the work of Obstfeld, 1996, for a review; Calvo, 1995; or the more
recent work of Lahiri and Vegh, 2000; and Chang and Velasco, 1999). Another strand of this
literature has focused on developing indicators for predicting these currency crises (Lizondo,
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998) or identifying the transmission of these crises internationally
(Glick and Rose, 1999; Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 1996). 
4Most  of  this  work  has  focused  on  the  macroeconomic  issues  and  the  policy
adjustment countries should pursue in response to devaluation. There has been much less
work  focused  on  the  microeconomic  implications  of  devaluation  and  the  effects  of  the
changes on industry composition and a country’s bilateral trading behavior. Since the work of
Edwards (1989) there has been no systematic analysis of the effects of large exchange rate
devaluations on the industry composition of trade flows in developing countries. Some recent
studies have focused on the importance of trade flows as a mechanism for the transmission of
international currency crises. Glick and Rose (1999) show that trade flows are one of the
most important channels through which exchange rate crises are transmitted internationally.
In the context of developed countries, exchange rate movements have been shown to affect a
country’s  industrial  structure  by  stimulating  investment,  employment  and  wages  in  more
export-oriented industries. There is also increasing evidence, for industrialized countries, that
industries  differ  in  their  ability  to  adjust  the  foreign  currency  price  of  their  exports  in
response to a home currency depreciation. This degree of exchange rate passthrough into
final  good  prices  has  been  shown  to  depend  on  the  size  of  the  market  and  the  industry
characteristics of the products (Goldberg and Knetter, 1997; Yang, 1997). However, there has
not  been  much  work  on  the  evolution  of  a  country’s  bilateral  flows  resulting  from  a
devaluation. That is the gap in the literature that this study will address.
3. Changes in the industry composition of trade flows
Large exchange rate changes affect the economy through changes in the relative
prices of goods in the economy. A nominal devaluation often transforms itself into a real
devaluation, meaning that domestically produced goods are now cheaper relative to foreign
produced goods, thus increasing the attractiveness of domestically produced goods abroad.
These  changes  in  the  relative  prices  of  goods  might  lead  to  significant  changes  in  the
composition of a country’s export flows. In a world of integrated international markets for
goods  a  country’s  export  and  import  patterns  are  determined  by  the  law  of  comparative
advantage. Changes in the relative prices of goods due to large devaluations of the home
currency can lead a country to change the industry composition of goods in the economy in
which it has a comparative advantage.
To look at the changes in the industry composition of a country’s trade flows, we
looked at the industry pattern of trade 3 to 5 years prior to the devaluation and compared it
with the industry composition of trade flows 3 to 5 years after the devaluation. We excluded
the years close to the devaluation date for two reasons: 1) we wanted industry adjustment and
trade  flows  to  have  sufficient  time  to  adjust  to  the  new  equilibrium;  2)  we  wanted  to
minimize the impact that differences in the timing of the devaluation within the year could
have on our observations, given that we were working with annual data.
The  composition  of  trade  flows  shows  a  large  degree  of  persistence  across  the
countries  in  our  sample.  In  Table  3  we  report  summary  statistics  for  the  persistence  of
industry trade flows using three different measures. First, we look at the highest level of
industry  aggregation  (the  1-digit  industry  classification  of  trade  flows)  and  examine  the
correlation among the ranking of industries according to their share of the country’s total
trade value before and after the devaluation. The correlation among the industry rankings is
extremely high (not reported but always above 0.8). As an indication, the first two columns
show how many of the top five industries by trade value prior to the devaluation were also
among the top five industries after the devaluation. In most cases, at least four of the top five
export and import industries were still at the top after the devaluation. Only in El Salvador
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among  the  top  five  after  the  devaluation.  This  same  pattern  appears  even  when  more
disaggregated industry definitions are used. In the following columns of Table 3 we report a
similar result using the 2-digit industry classification rather than the 1-digit, and looking at
the  top  5  and  top  20  export  and  import  industries  in  the  country.  Again  the  degree  of
persistence in industry trade flows is very high. Even at this more disaggregated industry
level, 17 of the top 20 industries prior to the devaluation are still in the top 20 after the
devaluation. There is, at any point in time, slightly more variation among the top 5 industries
using the 2-digit classification, but the persistence among the top 20 is extremely robust.
Finally, for completeness, we report the correlation of industries at the 2-digit level before
and after the devaluation, ranked by the value of their trade flows. The correlation of industry
export and import patterns is very high. It is especially high for the two large countries that
devalued  their  currencies  in  the  1990s,  Brazil  and  Mexico.  This  suggests  that  the  trade
adjustment suffered by these countries was somewhat smaller.
This persistence in the industry composition of trade flows might not seem all that
surprising, given that, after all, any country will have comparative advantages in a certain
range  of  products,  and  this  comparative  advantage  is  likely  to  be  determined  by  factor
endowments, technology, location and other factors apart from exchange rates. However, we
might expect changes in the exchange rate to affect the relative importance of each of these
top industries in the country’s overall trade. To get a better understanding of this effect, in the
third and fourth column of Table 3 we report the standard deviation of the changes in the
share of each 1-digit industry in the country’s total trade before and after the devaluation. As
a benchmark for interpretation, remember that, because we are looking at 10 industries, the
average industry share is 0.1. (3) The median of these standard deviations across countries for
import and export industries is 0.046. This suggests that 60% of the changes in the relative
trade shares of the industries were smaller than 5% of the country’s overall trade, or to put it
another way, that the average change in the share of trade flows for 1-digit industries was
smaller than 50% of their pre-devaluation share. This result suggests that devaluation has not
led  to  tremendous  shifts  in  the  industry  composition  of  trade  flows  in  these  countries.
However, significant differences can be observed between the countries in the sample.  For
the  three  large  countries  (Brazil,  Mexico  and  Argentina)  in  the  sample,  changes  in  the
industry  composition  of  imports  were  more  important  than  changes  in  the  industry
composition of exports, while for the smaller countries the opposite was the case. Also, the
average size adjustment for imports was larger in the large countries than in the smaller
countries.
4. Changes in the country composition of trade flows
We  performed  a  similar  analysis  of  the  composition  of  trade  flows  by  trading
partner. Insofar as the devaluation is a shock specific to the devaluating country, it should not
affect  the  relative  price  of  goods  from  different  partner  countries.  The  relative  prices  of
foreign  goods  could  change  due  to  other  effects  such  as  differences  in  the  industry
composition of trade flows, as suggested above, or differences in the market structure of the
different  countries.  To  the  extent  that  market  structure  differs,  the  degree  of  industry
passthrough of the exchange rate prices into final goods prices might differ and this might
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(3) This number should be used only as a rough approximation, since the distribution of industry shares in total
trade is highly skewed.result  in  changes  in  the  relative  prices  of  the  goods  from  different  partner  countries.  To
analyze the size and importance of this effect, we computed bilateral real exchange rates for
each of the top 10 trading partners, using consumer price indexes. We then looked at the
decomposition  of  these  bilateral  exchange  rates  and  observed  that  the  correlation  among
these bilateral exchange rates was very high. The correlation for these bilateral exchange
rates  between  the  devaluating  country  and  all  of  its  trading  partners  was  always  in  the
interval 0.51 to 0.94, with an average correlation across all of the devaluating countries of
0.863 (4). Given this high correlation at the aggregate country level, we should not expect
large  changes  in  overall  relative  prices  between  partner  countries,  although  some  large
differences at the industry level might remain hidden at this level of aggregation.
In Table 4 we report the results of an analysis similar to that performed for the
industry composition of trade flows. For each devaluing country, we report the persistence in
the ranking of its trading partners. The persistence of export and import trading partners is
very high. On average 18 of the top 20 partner countries prior to the devaluation remain
among the top 20 trading partners after the devaluation. There is slightly more persistence in
the set of importing countries than in the set of exporting countries in the sample. There is a
fair amount of variation among the top 5 trading partners in the sample. On average only 3 of
the top 5 countries remain among the top 5 trading partners in the sample. Note, however,
that this may not necessarily be due to the devaluation. Changes in the relative prices of
traded goods among the different trading partners and changes in the prices of one traded
good relative to another traded good, due to fluctuations in world markets, may also result in
changes in the relative importance of each trading partner. Finally, we looked at the standard
deviation of changes in the share of each of the top 20 partner countries. The median standard
deviation for the changes in trade share of each country is 0.011. In 60% of cases the partner
countries’ share of total trade changes by less than 1 percent of the country’s total trade. This
suggests that the behavior of relative trade flows is extremely persistent across the different
trading partners. 
We also looked at changes in the relative importance of trading partners by their
total  trading  value.  The  Spearman  rank  correlation  measure  of  the  evolution  of  trading
partners  was  found  to  be  always  greater  than  0.5  and  fairly  stable  across  countries.
Devaluating countries continue to trade primarily with their existing trading partners. There
are no significant differences between the behavior of export and import patterns. There is,
however, a substantial difference when we compare these values to those of the changes in
the industry composition of trade flows. There is more persistence in the ranking of industry
compositions than in the ranking of trading partners. This suggests that devaluation tends to
change the country composition of trade flows more than the industry composition of those
flows. This statistic does not provide any information about the behavior of the absolute
volume of bilateral trade flows in a country. We shall now proceed to analyse these aggregate
flows.
5. The behavior of aggregate and bilateral trade flows
Table 5 reports the aggregate behavior of total import and export values (measured
in USD) for the countries in the sample during the period 1986-1999. In all cases, we observe
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(4) We are in the process of computing industry-specific bilateral exchange rates using as price indexes the unit
values of export and import for the different industries, for the countries for which data on trade volume and
trade value is available.a positive trend in the behavior of trade flows during this period, resulting from the increased
openness of these economies to international markets. There is a striking difference between
the behavior of export and import volumes around the devaluation episodes. Exports tend, on
average, to increase in the year of the devaluation and the following two years. Only in
Argentina, Peru and Venezuela do we observe negative export growth in the second year after
the devaluation, and this probably has more to do with the circumstances in world markets at
that time, especially in the United States. In all other cases, exports continue to increase.
There is a marked difference between the first and second and third years. In most cases we
observe one or two years of double-digit export growth, followed by a further one or two
years  in  which  the  growth  of  exports  declines  substantially.  Import  volume,  in  contrast,
behaves quite differently. In most of the devaluation episodes (five out of eight), import
volume contracted; only in the two devaluations by large countries in the mid 1990s (Mexico
and  Brazil)  was  there  substantial  positive  import  growth.  In  all  other  cases,  the  import
contraction was short-lived. Import growth started to pick up in all countries by the second
year after the devaluation, and in most cases the rate of growth of imports was substantially
higher than before the devaluation.
We also looked at the effect of the devaluation on the composition of bilateral trade
flows by major trading partner. Table 6 reports, for each country, the evolution of imports and
exports to and from the 20 major trading partners. In each column we show the rate of growth
of trade volumes from the trade flows over the years t-2 to t-3, to the trade flows over the
period t+2 to t+3 (where t is the year the devaluation took place). Again we take the average
of  a  two-year  period  to  avoid  capturing  outlier  behavior  due  to  sporadic  trading  activity
during a single year. There are two consistent patterns: 1) except in the case of the larger
countries, imports into the country tend to originate from larger, more developed countries; 2)
after  the  devaluation,  trade  grows  more  with  neighboring  countries  in  Latin  America,
especially in the case of exports.  Exports increase faster than average to countries in the
region, and especially towards countries that are partners in regional trading agreements.
Brazil and Argentina increased their trading flows with each other significantly, and also with
other  countries  in  the  region  such  as  Chile  and  Paraguay.  There  was  also  a  significant
increase in regional trade among Central American countries: Honduras, El Salvador and
Guatemala, despite suffering an exchange rate crisis, increased their bilateral trade with one
another at a rate significantly above the average of their overall trade growth. The larger
countries such as Mexico and Argentina experienced significant increases in exports toward
more developed countries such as the United States, France, Netherlands and Spain. 
6. The sensitivity of bilateral trade flows to devaluations
We  now  further  analyze  the  sensitivity  of  bilateral  trade  flows  to  exchange  rate
devaluations by estimating a model of the reaction of trade flows to exchange rate changes.
As  we  saw  in  Section  2,  large  nominal  exchange  rate  depreciations  have  very  different
implications for real exchange rate movements. There is also considerable variability in the
rate of nominal and real bilateral exchange rate movements, depending on the devaluating
country’s trading partner. Therefore, we estimate a model of the behavior of bilateral trade
flows during the period around the devaluation against the devaluating country. The rates of
bilateral depreciation differ greatly, depending on the trading partner. We regress each of the
behaviors of each of the bilateral trade flows depicted in Table 6 above against the behavior
of the bilateral real and nominal exchange rates. 
8We estimated the following model of export (import) flows:
where %TF is the change in bilateral export (import) flows reported in Table 6 above; ∆eij,t is
the percentage change in the nominal (or real) bilateral exchange rate between country i and j
during the two years immediately following the devaluation; and Latin, ind and ngbr are
dummy variables that take the value of one when the partner country is a Latin American
country, an industrialized country, or a country that is either a neighbor of the depreciating
country or its partner in a regional trading agreement.
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 7. There is a sharp difference between
the behavior of import trade flows and export trade flows. There is no sensitivity of bilateral
import  flows  to  exchange  rate  movements.  In  all  estimated  models,  the  exchange  rate
variable is never significant. The only factor that seems to matter in determining import
sensitivity is the location of the trading partner. Import growth from neighboring countries, or
from  countries  with  which  the  devaluating  country  has  a  regional  trading  agreement,  is
consistently larger than the growth in imports from other countries (although not statistically
significant). An F-test of the hypothesis that all the estimated coefficients are significantly
different from zero can only be rejected in the specification in which we include the three
dummies of trading partner. In the other two specifications we cannot reject the hypothesis
that  all  coefficients  are  zero.  The  second  result  is  the  sensibility  of  export  behavior  to
exchange  rate  changes,  particularly  to  bilateral  real  exchange  rates.  In  all  cases,  higher
bilateral depreciations are correlated with larger increases in exports from the devaluating
country.  This effect is more important for real than for nominal exchange rate movements,
both in the statistical and in the economic sense. On average and according to the estimates in
row 5 of Table 7, the elasticity of export flows to real exchange rate changes is .08, and
highly  statistically  significant.  The  third  notable  result  is  that  the  export  sensitivity  of
bilateral  export  flows  to  exchange  rate  changes  is  much  larger  for  trade  flows  with
industrialized countries. According to the estimates in the last row of the export panel in
Table  7,  which  allows  for  differential  exchange  rate  responses  by  industrialized,  Latin
American and neighboring countries, the real exchange rate elasticity of trade flows is .21,
and again highly statistically significant. It is worth noting that the net effect of changes in
real exchange rates on trade flows with other Latin American countries is not significant, and
that the sum of the coefficients for a country that is a neighbor is basically zero (5).
7. Conclusions
This  paper  has  looked  at  the  behavior  of  trade  flows  in  a  number  of  cases  of
countries  that  experienced  an  extreme  nominal  exchange  rate  depreciation.  We  have
identified eight cases in Latin America of large nominal depreciations of the exchange rate
and have looked at the behavior of trade flows around these episodes. We have looked at the
persistence of import and export flows in terms of the relative importance of the industry
composition of these flows and the sample countries’ trading partners. We have also looked
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(5) This is the sum of the estimated coefficients on the real exchange rate and the interactions of the real
exchange rate with the Latin and ngbr dummies.
) * ( * ) * ( *
) * ( * * * * %
, 6 , 5
, 4 3 2 1 , 0 ,
ij t ij ij t ij
j t ij ij j j t ij t ij
ngbr e b ind e b
Latin e b ngbr b ind b Latin b e b a TF
∆ + ∆
+ ∆ + + + + ∆ + =at the sensitivity of bilateral trade flows from these countries to the large exchange rate
movements.
The  composition  of  trade  flows  shows  a  very  persistent  pattern  around  these
episodes of large exchange rate movements. Both the industry composition of trade and the
country  composition  of  trading  partners  remain  stable  after  the  devaluation  occurs.  The
relative importance of export and import industries in the countries’ trade flows does not vary
substantially,  nor  does  the  importance  of  the  different  source  countries  for  imports  and
destination countries for exports. Exports to industrialized countries are especially sensitive
to changes in the real exchange rate, while bilateral import flows do not show much reaction
to changes in the bilateral exchange rates. Our estimates suggest that exports from these
countries  to  industrialized  countries  have  an  average  elasticity  to  real  exchange  rate
movements of 0.21.
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Brief summary of the economic situation of the countries included in the study (6)
Peru, 1990
Political situation
Peruvians  concerned  about  the  economic  situation,  the  increasing  terrorist  threat
from Sendero Luminoso, and allegations of official corruption chose Alberto Fujimori, a
relatively unknown mathematician-turned-politician, as president in 1990. 
The Fujimori government reduced the terrorist threat of Shining Path (SL) and the
MRTA.  The  capture  or  death  of  several  remaining  terrorist  leaders  marked  continuing
progress  in  eliminating  the  once  great  threat  posed  by  the  SL  and  MRTA  terrorist
organizations, who since 1990 had committed the great majority of killings and human rights
abuses
Following  an  April  5,  1992  coup,  President  Fujimori  dissolved  the  legislature,
removed many judges and prosecutors appointed by the previous government, suspended
portions of the 1979 Constitution, and began to rule by decree. 
As a result, economic assistance was suspended by the U.S. and some other donors.
The elections for the new Constituent Congress held November 22, 1992 were, however,
judged fair by international observers. The new Constituent Congress, in which President
Fujimori’s supporters held a strong majority, drafted a new constitution that was narrowly
approved by popular referendum on October 31, 1993.
Economic situation
On  July  28,  1990,  President  Fujimori  inherited  a  country  in  arrears  to  foreign
lenders,  with  no  international  reserves,  and  a  heavily  regulated  economy  with  distorted
relative prices. The economy was in deep recession, with GDP down 23 percent over the
1988-90  period.  Extreme  economic  mismanagement  by  the  Garcia  administration  led  to
hyperinflation from 1988 to 1990.
Fujimori implemented drastic orthodox measures as part of a structural adjustment
program. This program included trade liberalization, elimination of price controls so as to
bring relative prices into line, liberalization of the investment and foreign exchange regimes,
and a reduction in the size of the public sector. The goal of the structural adjustment program
was to reduce inflation to manageable levels and create conditions for sustained economic
growth. The program succeded in bringing inflation down from 7,650% in 1990 to 139% in
1991
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(6) This is a partial summary of the economic situation of these countries taken from Country Reports of the
IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Department of State.Appendix (continued)
The stress of structural adjustment, including austere monetary and fiscal policies,
contributed  to  a  severe  recession  in  1992,  exacerbated  by  drought  and  difficult  fishing
conditions  created  by  the  “El  Nino”  weather  phenomenon,  with  a  small  recovery  of  the
fishing and agricultural industry in 1993.
In  March  1993,  Peru  cleared  its  arrears  with  the  World  Bank  (IBRD)  and  the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for about $1.8 billion.
Combined with increased mining productivity and new foreign investment due to an
improved investment climate and privatization, growth started to revive. 
Inflation was reduced to the lowest monthly level in 17 years.
Exchange Rate Policy 
The Fujimori government liberalized the exchange rate regime, eliminating multiple
rates and other distortionary policies. This liberalization was further supported in the new
constitution, which guaranteed free access to and free disposition of foreign currency. No
restrictions existed on the purchase, use or remittance of foreign exchange. Exporters were
not required to channel their foreign exchange transactions through the Central Bank; they
could conduct their transactions freely on the open market
The exchange rate was determined by market forces, with some intervention by the
Central  Bank  to  stabilize  movements.  The  government’s  ability  to  manage  monetary
aggregates was limited, however, by the increasing “dollarization” of the Peruvian economy.
Without capital and exchange controls, U.S. dollars accounted in 1993 for over 70 percent of
the liquidity in the economy. 
Honduras, 1990
Political situation
In January 1990, President Callejas took office as the new president. A member of
the  National  Party,  he  ruled  the  country  for  four  years  and  implemented  an  aggressive
program of economic reforms. This program stabilized the economy but failed to bring stable
economic growth, partly due to negative terms of trade and shocks from world markets. As a
result of the poor economic performance, the government lost popular support. In the next
elections, held in November 1993, President Carlos Roberto Reina of the Liberal Party was
elected by a wide margin. He had been critical of the economic program and promised to put
a more human face on government policies. He took office on January 27, 1994. 
Economic situation and structural policies
The newly elected government of President Callejas, faced a deteriorating economic
situation. Moving quickly to confront the crisis, Callejas embarked on an ambitious economic 
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reform program. This program of structural reform involved dismantling much of Honduras’
elaborate  system  of  price  controls,  opening  up  the  economy  to  foreign  competition  by
dramatically lowering import tariff duties and removing most non-tariff barriers to trade, and
adopting a free market exchange rate regime. The program also involved adopting a package
to reduce fiscal expenditure and increase revenues so as to balance the fiscal budget. The
deficit reduction measures included increasing sales tax, simplifying the income tax structure,
removing a number of tax and duty exemptions, improving tax collections, increasing some
public utility rates, and raising oil prices. This deficit reduction program bore fruit, with the
fiscal deficit, as a percent of GDP, declining from 7.1 at the end of 1990 to 4.3 percent in
1991.
During the 1990s, the Honduran economy was hit by declining world prices for its
traditional exports of bananas and coffee. The unfavorable terms of trade, high external debt
levels, and flawed economic policies seemed to doom Honduras to a decade of low growth
rates and declining living standards.
Exchange rate policy
Honduras had followed a nominal fixed-exchange rate policy for most of the 1980s.
This  policy  was  supported  by  an  increasingly  complex  system  of  price  controls  and
restrictions on capital flows. The Honduran government abandoned the fixed exchange rate
system and gradually moved to a flexible exchange rate mechanism in 1990. From 1990, the
Honduran Central Bank adopted restrictive monetary and credit policies. Interest rate ceilings
on  commercial  bank  loans  were  gradually  removed  in  1990-91,  and  the  Central  Bank
increased the rate charged to commercial banks for reserve shortfalls. These measures led to a
rise  in  deposit  rates  and  restored  equilibrium  to  the  credit  markets.  They  allowed  for  a
transition to a floating exchange rate regime in June 1992.
To provide a more transparent and efficient foreign exchange market, the Honduran
Central Bank legalized and licensed the operations of Foreign Exchange Trading Houses
(Casas de Cambio), which until then had been black market establishments. As of June 1993,
there  were  15  licensed  Foreign  Exchange  Houses  actively  competing  in  this  market
nationwide.  In  1992  the  Central  Bank  authorized  commercial  banks  to  operate  foreign
exchange trading desks and compete with exchange houses. In July 1992, a major speculative
run  on  the  lempira  prompted  the  Central  Bank  to  adopt  a  series  of  restrictive  monetary
measures in support of the exchange rate. 
El Salvador, 1990
Political situation
President  Alfredo  Cristiani  took  office  in  1989.  In  June  of  that  year,  President
Cristiani called for direct dialogue to end the decade of conflict between the government and
the  FMLN  guerrilla.  An  unmediated  dialogue  process  was  initiated  in  September  1989,
lasting until the FMLN launched a bloody, nationwide offensive in November of that year. In 
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early 1990, following a request from a group of Central American presidents, the United
Nations became involved in an effort to mediate direct talks between the two sides.
On December 31, 1991, the government and the FMLN initialed a peace agreement
that  led  to  the  signing  of  a  final  agreement  in  Mexico  City,  called  the  Accords  of
Chapultepec, on January 16, 1992. A 9-month cease-fire took effect February 1, 1992, and
was never broken. A ceremony held on December 15, 1992, marked the official end of the
conflict.
Economic situation
El Salvador turned decisively toward market-oriented economic policies in the four
years following the election of President Cristiani. The government sharply reduced the high
tariff barriers (with duties of up to 240 percent on some items) and created a new system in
which most duties fell in a range of five to twenty percent. Non-tariff barriers and import
licensing also were almost totally abolished. Internal price controls on 240 consumer goods
were dismantled. The Government also dismantled its agricultural monopolies, privatized the
banking  system,  gradually  removed  interest  rate  controls  and  internal  price  controls,  and
privatized a number of the utility and communication firms operating in the country. 
Fiscal policy was the biggest challenge facing the Cristiani government. The peace
accords  signed  with  the  FMLN  in  December  1991  committed  the  government  to  heavy
expenditures  for  transition  programs  and  social  services.  A  mixture  of  foreign  aid,  debt
forgiveness by the U.S. and new credits from international financial institutions allowed El
Salvador to experience four years of continuous growth.
Exchange rate policy
A multiple exchange rate regime that was used to conserve foreign exchange and as
an attempt to fix the nominal exchange rate was phased out during 1990 and replaced by a
free-floating rate. On several occasions, the Central Bank intervened in the exchange market
to moderate speculative pressures and soften exchange rate fluctuations. El Salvador’s net
international reserves increased impressively during this period. This increase in reserves was




In  January  1994,  insurgents  in  the  state  of  Chiapas  took  up  arms  against  the
government, protesting oppression and governmental indifference to poverty. After 12 days
of fighting, a cease-fire was negotiated. This political turmoil, aggravated by the murder, also
in 1994, of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) candidate for the Presidency, Luis 
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Donaldo Colosio, at a rally in front of hundreds of supporters, led to an increase in political
uncertainty surrounding the results of the upcoming elections. Yet the PRI, which had ruled
Mexico for 70 years, found a way to mend its internal rifts and, with the power of the party’s
formidable electoral machinery, its candidate won the presidential election. His main rival in
the race was Vicente Fox, the candidate for the center-right National Action Party (PAN),
who became president in the next elections.
Economic situation
The government of President Salinas, during the early 1990s, followed policies of
economic liberalization, through the opening up of the economy to international transactions
and the privatization and deregulation of heavily state-controlled industries. From 1986 the
Mexican government privatized or eliminated more than 1000 state-controlled companies.
Privatizations during the Salinas administration included commercial banks, airlines, steel
production,  the  telephone  company,  a  television  network  and  several  major  industrial
facilities. 
The  defining  event  of  the  Salinas  administration  was  the  signing  of  the  North
American  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA),  which  came  into  force  in  January  1994  and
allowed  for  free  trade  between  the  United  States,  Canada  and  Mexico.  The  agreement
provided  for  the  progressive  elimination  of  tariffs,  nontariff  barriers,  and  quotas  for
merchandise trade; the gradual opening of the Mexican central government procurement and
construction contracts to bidding by U.S. and Canadian firms; and the establishment of clear
dispute resolution and international arbitration procedures to provide protection to U.S. and
Canadian investors in Mexico. Through 1994, an increase in capital outflows out of Mexico,
fuelled by the political uncertainty surrounding the elections and by the appreciated Mexican
peso, led to a decrease in the amount of foreign reserves held by the Central Bank, and to the
devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994.
In response to the December 1994 economic crisis (which plunged Mexico into its
worst recession in 60 years), the Mexican government instituted tight fiscal and monetary
policies. 
Exchange rate policy 
On December 22, 1994, Mexico abandoned its exchange band mechanism, which
had been in place since November 1991, in favor of a free floating exchange rate. The peso
continued to float freely, with only infrequent interventions by the Bank of Mexico (Mexico’s
central bank). The surprise devaluation by the Bank of Mexico led to a large capital outflow
from the country, which resulted in a large nominal depreciation of the Mexican peso. In
1995, the Bank of Mexico intervened three times to stabilize the peso in the face of extreme
volatility generated by rumors and/or trader speculation. This depreciation, in turn, resulted
in an economic recession as the relative prices of imported goods rose and exports became
increasingly  more  competitive.  The  Mexican  economy  recovered  quite  rapidly  from  the
economic crisis due to the depreciation.
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By  1996  Mexico  had  achieved  the  objectives  set  in  the  emergency  program
developed to cope with the crisis deriving from the devaluation. The retirement of the $29
billion in short-term dollar-denominated notes (“tesobonos”) outstanding at the end of 1994,
the early repayment to the U.S. Treasury of the $7 billion loan extended to Mexico during
1995, and the placement of over $24 billion in international capital markets were among the
most telling events of the Mexican economic recovery. 
Venezuela, 1989
Political and economic situation
The government of Jaime Lusinchi (president, 1984-89) attempted to reverse the
1983 economic crisis through a combination of currency devaluation, the establishment of a
multi-tier exchange-rate system, greater import protection, increased attention to agriculture
and food self-sufficiency, and the generous use of producer and consumer subsidies. These
1983 reforms stimulated a recovery from the negative growth rates of the early 1980s and led
to modest growth from 1985 to 1988.
By 1989, however, the economy could no longer support the high rates of subsidies
and  the  increasing  foreign  debt  burden,  particularly  in  light  of  the  nearly  50  percent
reduction,  during  1986,  of  the  price  of  oil,  which  represented  over  80%  of  Venezuelan
exports.
In  1989  the  administration  of  President  Carlos  Andrés  Pérez  launched  policy
reforms with the support of structural adjustment loans from the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank. In February of that year, price increases directly related to these reforms
caused several days of rioting and looting that left hundreds dead in the country’s worst
violence since its return to democracy in 1958. This political turmoil culminated in February
1992,  when  a  group  of  army  lieutenant  colonels  led  by  future  President  Hugo  Chavez
mounted an unsuccessful coup attempt, claiming that the events of 1989 showed that the
political  system  no  longer  served  the  interests  of  the  people.  A  year  later,  Congress
impeached  Pérez  on  corruption  charges.  Deep  popular  dissatisfaction  with  the  traditional
political  parties,  income  disparities,  and  economic  difficulties  were  some  of  the  major
frustrations expressed by Venezuelans following Pérez’s impeachment.
Exchange rate policy
The most fundamental of the 1989 adjustments was the massive devaluation of the
bolivar from its highly overvalued rate to a market rate. This devaluation unified all exchange
rates from the official B14=US$1 rate to the new B36=US$1 rate, which was a floating rate
subject to the supply and demand of the market. By late 1990, the value of the bolivar had
crept down to B43=US$1. 
In a related matter, the Differential Exchange System Office (Régimen de Cambio
de Dinero—Recadi), the organization that oversaw the various exchange rates, became the 
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focus of one of the biggest scandals of the decade. Between 1983 and 1988, businessmen
bribed Recadi officials in return for access to halfpriced United States dollars to funnel an
alleged US$8 billion overseas. When the scandal broke in 1989, law enforcement agents
investigated  as  many  as  2,800  businesses  and  more  than  100  executives  from  leading
multinational enterprises fled the country in fear of prosecution. 
Guatemala, 1990
Political situation
In  January  1986,  President  Cerezo’s  civilian  government  announced  that  its  top
priorities  would  be  to  end  the  political  violence  and  establish  the  rule  of  law.  Reforms
included new laws of habeas corpus and “amparo” (court-ordered protection), the creation of
a legislative human rights committee, and the establishment in 1987 of the Office of the
Human  Rights  Ombudsman.  With  Cerezo’s  election,  the  military  moved  away  from
governing and returned to the more traditional role of providing internal security, specifically
by fighting armed insurgents. Dissatisfied military personnel made two coup attempts in May
1988 and May 1989, but were unsuccessful due to the support by the military leadership of
the constitutional order.
The final 2 years of Cerezo’s government also were marked by a failing economy,
strikes, protests, and allegations of widespread corruption. The government’s inability to deal
with many of the nation’s problems (such as infant mortality, illiteracy, deficient health and
social  services,  and  rising  levels  of  violence)  contributed  to  popular  discontent.  New
presidential and congressional elections on November 11, 1990 led to the appointment as
President of Jorge Serrano, leader of a weak coalition between his own party (Movement of
Solidarity  Action),  the  Christian  Democrats  and  the  National  Union  of  the  Center.  The
Serrano administration’s record was mixed. It had some success in consolidating civilian
control over the army, replacing a number of senior officers and persuading the military to
participate in peace talks with the URNG. 
He took the politically unpopular step of recognizing the sovereignty of Belize. The
Serrano government reversed the economic slide it inherited, reducing inflation and boosting
real growth. 
Economic situation
The first 2 years of Cerezo’s administration were characterized by a stable economy
and by a marked decrease in political violence. Economic performance, however, declined
during the last two years of his administration, with widespread strikes and allegations of
political  corruption.  In  1990  the  new  government  implemented  a  program  of  structural
reforms, with strict controls on monetary policy and fiscal expenditures. Beginning in 1991,
Guatemala implemented a policy of zero net credit to the Central Government, which halted
the prior tendency to monetize the deficit. By drastically reducing expenditures in 1991, the
government successfully reduced the consolidated public sector deficit from 4.7 percent of 
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GDP in 1990 to just 1.6 percent in 1991. With the 1992 fiscal reform, the overall deficit fell
further to just 0.8 percent. As part of fiscal reform, the government simplified most taxes on
businesses operating in Guatemala and reduced tariffs. 
Exchange rate policy
Guatemala had a system of fixed nominal exchange rates during the 1980s, with
periodic  large  nominal  depreciations.  From  late  1990,  the  Bank  of  Guatemala  (BOG)
operated  an  official  auction  system  for  foreign  exchange.  Under  this  system,  foreign
exchange could be purchased for any use, subject to availability. Under Guatemalan law, all
foreign currency receipts had to be sold to the Bank of Guatemala. The BOG in turn made a
set amount of U.S. dollars available to both foreign and domestic bidders in the official
auction, which was held each business day. Under this system, the quetzal could depreciate
only five centavos every three weeks. The quetzal appreciated about seven percent in real
terms in 1991 and 1992.
Brazil, 1993/1994
Political situation
Brazil completed its transition to a popularly elected government in 1989, when
Fernando Collor de Mello won 53% of the vote in the first direct presidential election in 29
years.  In  1992,  a  major  corruption  scandal  led  to  the  impeachment  and  resignation  of
President Collor. Vice President Itamar Franco took his place and governed for the remainder
of Collor’s term. In October 1994, fresh presidential elections resulted in Fernando Henrique
Cardoso being elected President, with 54% of the vote. He took office January 1, 1995 and
was re-elected in October 1998 for a second 4-year term. 
Economic situation
Brazil had been subject to high levels of inflation since the early 1980s, and had
unsuccessfully attempted to rein in inflation several times prior to 1994’s Real Plan. During
the period of military rule prior to 1989, Brazil pursued industrialization policies based on
trade  protection,  import  substitution,  large  state-owned  enterprises,  and  high  levels  of
government spending financed through increases in the amount of money in circulation. By
1990,  hyperinflation  had  been  structured  into  the  economy,  through  both  indexation  and
expectations,  with  the  concomitant  debilitating  effects.  Prior  to  the  Real  Plan,  several
attempts were made to contain inflation, usually involving combinations of wage and price
controls,  tightening  of  the  money  supply,  tax  hikes,  freezing  of  bank  deposits  and  the
introduction  of  a  new  currency.  These  all  failed  as  the  fundamental  problem  lay  in
expectations of high inflation and excessive government spending.
The  Real  Plan,  introduced  in  December  1993  by  Finance  Minister  Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, differed from the previous plans in that it directly addressed the problem
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of inflationary expectations. Cardoso recognized that past inflation was being transmitted into
future expectations by indexing and various contract negotiations, as inflation figured into all
wage and business contracts. The idea was to break this connection by creating a unit of
transactional account in which price and wage contracts would be negotiated and written, and
whose value would be kept roughly equal to $1. The official currency, the cruzeiro real,
would then be devalued against this unit. The Unit was called the Unit of Real Value (URV),
and  was  introduced  in  March  1994.  At  the  same  time,  the  constitutional  links  between
revenue and expenditure were circumvented by creating a special fund (Fundo Social de
Emergencia - FSE) to eliminate the public sector deficit, thereby addressing a fundamental
source of inflationary pressure. (The creation of the FSE was necessary to avoid the structural
claims guaranteed by the constitution to the states and to entitlement programs.) Other key
components of the Plan included: the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the reduction
of the fiscal deficit, social security reform, and Constitutional reforms to deregulate the labor
market and to relax the excessive protections provided to public workers.
Four months after the introduction of the URV, the Real was introduced. The central
bank (Banco Central do Brazil) committed not to permit a depreciation beyond 1.00 Real/$,
though  appreciation  would  be  allowed.  Furthermore,  a  reserve  ratio  was  implemented
requiring  one  American  dollar  to  each  Real  issued.  The  result  of  the  Real  Plan  was  a
reduction in inflation from 50% per month, as of June 1994, to less than 2% per month by the
end  of  the  year.  Inflation  has  since  then  continued  to  drop,  and  in  May  1998  12-month
inflation was 3.12%, its lowest value since November 1949. The Real Plan also had positive
effects on the rate of economic activity during this period. Brazil’s real GDP grew at an
average  annual  rate  of  4.0%  during  the  four-year  period  1994-1997,  compared  with  an
average annual growth rate of -0.2% during the four years prior to the implementation of the
plan.
Exchange rate policy
Exchange rate stabilization was an integral part of the Real Plan. Upper and lower
bands (“maxibands”) –as indicators of the maximum possible movement up or down– were
established in March 1995, at a rate of .93 and .88 Real/$. While announcing these broader
“maxibands,” the central bank in practice followed a “crawling peg” system, in which the
Real gradually depreciated, but remained within a “miniband” surrounding a depreciating
central rate. Under this informal system, the Real’s central rate was devalued approximately
0.5%-0.6%/month, and central bank intervention assured that at all times the spot rate did not
deviate by more than 0.25% (half the “miniband width”) in either direction. In practice, the
central rate was devalued discretely by about 0.10% (although sometimes 0.05% or 0.15%)
about 5-7 times per month. Starting April 1997, the government started devaluing the central
rate  by  about  0.7%  monthly.  To  discourage  speculation  against  the  system,  the  actual
magnitude and timing of these mini-devaluations was kept slightly irregular.  Furthermore,
the size of the minidevaluation would be smaller than the width of the miniband itself, so the
instantaneous direction of the spot rate could not be known with certainty, discouraging “one
way” bets. 
While this system of a predictable crawling peg surrounded by a miniband provided
short-term stability in the spot rate, the government wished to maintain some flexibility over
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longer  periods  such  as  several  months.  To  commit  to  a  very  narrow  range,  even  one
surrounding a crawling peg, risked tying the government’s hands unnecessarily and inviting
outside speculation against the currency. Thus, the government remained free to alter either
the rate of devaluation or the width of the miniband. At the same time, the government also
wished to provide some indicative levels for medium-term forecasting. This dual objective
was reached by instituting wider “maxibands.” Though the exchange rate never technically
violated  these  bands,  the  central  bank  adjusted  the  maxibands  as  markets  gradually
approached the maximum Real/$ exchange rate, an event that has typically occurred every
six to twelve months.
Since the original maxibands were implemented in March 1995, the bands were
changed on four separate occasions: June 22, 1995; January 30, 1996; February 18, 1997, and
January 19,1998. In April of 1998, the government also announced that the lower end of the
miniband  would  depreciate  at  a  rate  of  0.65%  a  month,  while  the  upper  band  would
depreciate at a rate of 0.75%, de facto widening the minibands over time. The Real had been
under  much  pressure  to  depreciate  due  to  the  overall  turmoil  in  international  financial
markets  since  the  beginning  of  the  Asian  crisis  in  July  1997.  This  increased  volatility,
coupled with the inability of the Brazilian government to commit to some of the structural
reforms in their fiscal accounts and social security system, led to wide speculation on the
viability of the exchange rate system in the fall of 1998. This speculation subsided after the
Brazilian  government  agreed  to  an  IMF-led  financial  package  in  November  1998.  The
government announced another realignment of the maxibands on January 12, 1999 amid
intense turmoil in the financial markets. The day after the Real had depreciated to the upper
end of the new band, the government abandoned the system and let the Real float
Argentina, 1989
Political situation
In  1985  and  1987,  large  turnouts  for  elections  demonstrated  continued  public
support for a strong and vigorous democratic system. The UCR-led government took steps to
resolve some of the nation’s most pressing problems, including accounting for those who had
disappeared  during  military  rule,  establishing  civilian  control  of  the  armed  forces,  and
consolidating democratic institutions. However, constant friction with the military, failure to
resolve  endemic  economic  problems,  and  an  inability  to  maintain  public  confidence
undermined the effectiveness of the Alfonsin government, which left office 6 months early
after Peronist candidate Carlos Raul Menem won the 1989 presidential elections. 
Menem  introduced  structural  reforms  which  reversed  the  role  of  the  state  in
Argentine economic life. Menem was not reluctant to use the presidency’s extensive powers
to issue decrees when Congress was unable to reach consensus on his proposed reforms.
Those powers were abolished when the constitution was reformed in 1994 as a result of the
Olivos Pact with the opposition Radical Party. 
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Economic situation
The 1991 convertibility law established a currency board, which has been a pillar of
price stability. During the 1990s, Argentina implemented a successful economic restructuring
based  on  macroeconomic  stabilization,  trade  liberalization,  privatization,  and  public
administrative reform, which placed the country on a relatively sound economic footing after
decades  of  decline  and  high  inflation.  However,  Argentina  still  needs  to  complete  some
difficult structural reforms to ensure a steady growth path.
The government privatized most state-controlled companies, opened the economy to
foreign  trade  and  investment,  improved  tax  collection,  and  created  private  pension  and
worker compensation systems. As a result of these policies, Argentina experienced a boom in
economic growth in the early 1990s, followed by a period of more erratic growth in the
second half of the decade when the country was hit by a series of external economic shocks.
While the economy recovered fairly quickly from the effects of the “Tequila” crisis of 1995,
Argentina is finding it harder to return to strong growth after the recession that followed
successive shocks from East Asia, Russia, and Brazil.
Exchange rate policy
During most of the 1980s Argentina followed a flexible exchange rate system as a
direct result of its high inflation policies. It underwent several hyperinflations and changes in
its national currency. In 1991 president Menem established the Convertibility law, which
created a new currency, fixed the nominal exchange rate to the U.S. dollar at a value of one,
and established a currency board by which all national currency was fully backed by U.S.
dollars. At the same time, the U.S. dollar became an accepted medium of exchange within the
economy, and there was a liberalization of international capital flows. This currency board
was successful in stabilizing inflation during the 1990s and brought macroeconomic stability
to the country during this period. Inflation rates in the early 1990s, which, although low, were
higher than U.S. inflation rates, resulted in a real appreciation of the currency, which hurt the

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Table 2. Events of Nominal Exchange Rate Depreciation 
Year  2-year nominal 2-year real 5-year real 
of crisis   depreciation rate  depreciation rate  depreciation rate  
Brazil  1993/94  8900  -26.10  48.50  
Mexico  1995  146  63.00  6.62 
Argentina  1989  46800  -32.00  -44.61  
El Salvador  1990  113.2  40.20  6.02  
Guatemala  1990  85.4  15.30  -2.70  
Honduras  1990  170  78.00  2.57  
Peru  1990  18146  -12.80  -17.13  
Venezuela 1989  247.5  52.50  16.53     
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